Testimony of John R. Phillips on H.R. 4563, False Claims Act technical
amendments of 1992, before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations
April 1, 1992
I appreciate the invitation to appear before your committee today, Mr. Chairman, to
discuss generally the implementation of the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act,
and to specifically address the issues raised by Congressman Berman's proposed
legislation.
I first testified before this committee in 1986 when Congress was considering
amendments to update and modernize the century-old False Claims Act to make it a more
effective weapon for fighting the chronic problem of fraud against the government. Two
years ago, I returned to provide you with a "progress report," from the
plaintiff's perspective, on the implementation of those 1986 amendments.
Today, the act remains a very effective tool for bringing forward instances of fraud.
Moreover, we are finally reaching the point in the litigation pipeline where very
substantial recoveries will become common. These recoveries will encourage new qui tam
plaintiffs to come forward and, more importantly, should deter government contractors and
others from wrongdoing.
Clearly, the most controversial aspect of the act today is the question of whether the
qui tam provisions should be available to a government employee. The legislative history
of the 1986 amendments is absolutely silent on the question, and although I worked closely
with members of Congress in both the House and Senate, providing some technical background
and assistance as the 1986 amendments were being drafted, I have no recollection of the
government employee issue being raised by anyone.
In retrospect, it is not surprising that the government employee issue was not
identified in 1986. Because the pre-1986 law barred any qui tam case based on information
already in the government's possession, by definition, government employees could not file
qui tam cases. A key purpose of the 1986 amendments was the removal of this jurisdictional
bar, which had the unnoticed side effect of removing the prohibition on suits by
government employees.
Recently, several government employees have filed cases under the False Claims Act, and
the courts, after searching the legislative record and the language of the statute, have
concluded that there is no express prohibition against suits by government employees. This
has raised the question of how to resolve the False Claims Act's purpose of encouraging
those with knowledge of fraud to come forward with broader concerns about the role and
obligations of government employees.
The vast majority of government employees are men and women of integrity who are
motivated by their feelings of public spirit to take jobs that often involve considerable
financial sacrifice. The Department of Justice, however, is concerned that there are some
government employees who, rather than reporting fraud they uncover, would instead convert
that information into lawsuits where they could achieve great personal gain. While we have
seen no evidence that any significant problem now exists, we must acknowledge its
theoretical possibility. And if such practices were to occur, the image and integrity of
the False Claims Act would suffer.
In more than five years, we have screened hundreds of cases and have filed fewer than
two dozen. From that process, we have yet to represent a government employee. This is
true, in part, because we are troubled by the public policy considerations, but also, in
part, because we have not yet been presented with a government employee case that meets
our stringent criteria. The fact remains, however, that there may well be instances where
government employees are unable to get their superiors to act upon clear evidence of
fraud. In those instances, we believe strongly that the False Claims Act should actively
encourage the employee to come forward and should provide a mechanism for action.
We are aware of two separate approaches to deal with this issue. One alternative is to
create an incentive for government employees, who have reported evidence of false claims
to their superiors and who have been unsuccessful in spurring their superior to act, to
bring that information to the attention of the appropriate inspector general or the
Department of Justice. If the Justice Department initiates a false claims action and
obtains a recovery, and if the employee's actions are above and beyond the ordinary scope
of the employee's official duties, the Attorney General could then be granted the
discretion to provide a reward to the individual. To be effective, such a reward system
needs to include (1) a commitment by the Department of Justice to investigate false claims
allegations made by government employees, and (2) a commitment that when the information
does lead to a recovery, the Attorney General will generously reward those employees who
provided the information. Being a whistleblower -- whether in the private sector or as a
government employee -- carries a tremendous cost, and people need all the encouragement
they can get to take such a risk.
The second alternative represented by Congressman Berman's bill would utilize the
existing qui tam mechanism, with two key modifications. First, a qui tam government
employee would not be guaranteed the minimum recovery of 15 percent. Instead, in each
case, the court would have the discretion to provide for an award to the plaintiff of up
to 10 percent of the government's recovery, based on the extent to which the court
concludes that the government employee reasonably and in good faith attempted to bring the
violation to the attention of the government authority and that the authority had failed
to diligently investigate and pursue the action.
We believe this amendment offers a balanced approach to the competing concerns of
uncovering fraud without undercutting employee loyalty. (We, however, would recommend that
the percentage recovery available to the government employee be raised to the 15 percent
minimum recovery guaranteed to most other qui tam plaintiffs.) It will insure that those
employees who ultimately recover are only those who have acted consistently with their
employment obligations. At the same time, Congressman Berman's proposed amendment leaves
the door open for well-motivated government employees who have done everything within
their power to bring fraud to the attention of their superiors. And it will insure that
the courts are not deluged with government employee suits. Based on our own personal
experience, we are confident that few lawyers would be willing to spend the time and
resources necessary to pursue a false claims case if they did not believe that their
client, the government employee, would be able to meet the standard established by this
amendment. Finally, it is important to remember that under the proposed legislation, if a
government employee recovers, it means that a judge will have determined that the Treasury
actually recovered funds because of the acts taken by that government employee. Thus, the
government wins, the taxpayer wins -- only the defendant loses.
Congressman Berman's legislation before this committee also clarifies the act's bar
against parasitic lawsuits, and we fully support these clarifications. While the intent of
the 1986 amendments was to prohibit qui tam cases in which the qui tam plaintiff brought
no new information forward, the current public disclosure provision has been misconstrued
by some courts to bar legitimate, non-parasitic claims and claimants. For example, in
U.S. ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins., 944 F. 2d 1149 (3rd Cir. 1991), the Third
Circuit barred an action based on information obtained during civil discovery in
litigation between private parties. The court took great pains to sort through whether
discovery was encompassed in a "hearing" and whether it was "publicly
disclosed." In addition, the court rejected an argument that the language was meant
to bar suits based on allegations from litigation in which the government is a party. The
court in Stinson thus entirely missed the point of the 1986 prohibition -- to bar
only completely parasitic suits where the party has made no contribution to the
government's effort to prosecute fraud. The language in Congressman Berman's bill
recognizes that if a person discovers the basis for a false claims action in private
litigation where the government is not a party, that person is contributing by developing
that information into a false claims action and bringing the information to the attention
of the government.
In addition to correcting the Stinson decision, the proposed language makes it
clear that private efforts to discover and develop false claims actions -- even from a
variety of public sources -- are encouraged. For example, we have been working with one
nonprofit group and a number of medical experts to develop methods of identifying areas of
Medicare abuse. This could involve reviewing and analyzing publicly available data. The
language proposed by Congressman Berman makes it clear that such efforts could not be
barred by some court that gives an expansive reading to the Stinson decision.
Finally, the proposed language is intended to correct judicial misinterpretations of
the "original source" component of the "public disclosure" bar. The
intent of the original source provision was to provide a safeguard for those individuals
who had independent knowledge of allegations that were publicly disclosed, and therefore
would not be merely "parasitic" qui tam relators if they brought an action based
on such allegations. However, some courts have incorrectly ruled that all relators
must meet the original source test. U.S. v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 730 F.Supp.
1031 (D.Colo. 1990); U.S. ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17 (1st
Cir. 1990). The original source test is clearly to be invoked only after the case is found
to be based upon a section 3730(e)(4)(A) public disclosure.
In addition, some courts are requiring that "original sources" show they were
the source to the entity that publicly disclosed the allegations. U.S. ex rel. Dick v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13 (2nd Cir. 1990). other courts are interpreting
"direct and independent knowledge" as two separate tests to be met. U.S. v.
Rockwell Intern. Corr., 730 F.Supp. 1031 (D.Colo.1990) ; U.S. ex rel. Stinson, et
al. v. Prudential Ins., 736 F.Supp. 614 (D.N.J.1990).
The proposed language makes clear that to be an original source, a party must be able
to demonstrate that he or she did not learn of the allegations from the public disclosure.
So, for example, in a case where an individual provides information to a congressional
committee which is later revealed in a press report that individual is an original source
even though not the direct source of the allegations printed in the press report. In
addition, where a public interest group or law firm learns of the information on which the
allegations are based from their original source client, they qualify as original sources
since their knowledge is not derived merely from the public disclosure. See U.S. v.
Rockwell Intern. Corp., 730 F.Supp. 1031 (D.Colo.1990).
Now that we have more than five years' experience with the amended act, the question
that I am most often asked is whether these amendments are actually working. The simple
answer is yes. Fraud that would otherwise have gone undetected has now been exposed and
substantial additional recoveries are beginning to flow into the U.S. Treasury as a result
of the amendments. Information made available by the Department of Justice shows that
recovery from qui tam lawsuits has increased 300 percent in the last year alone. We expect
that trend to continue. For example, settlement negotiations are currently ongoing in two
large cases where we represent qui tam plaintiffs. The settlement offers (which the
government has rejected as being inadequate) in these two cases alone total nearly
$100,000,000. We are currently litigating four other large cases, each with a potential
recovery in excess of $100,000,000. (One of these cases is conservatively valued at
$300,000,000.) In 1985, the year before the 1986 amendments were enacted, the government
recovered $27,000,000 from all false claims cases. When you compare that total to the
likely recoveries from just our handful of qui tam cases, the effectiveness of the act's
qui tam provisions is readily apparent.
While such anticipated rewards to the qui tam plaintiffs and their attorneys may appear
substantial, these rewards do not come without great risk and sacrifice. One of the main
congressional objectives as expressed in the legislative history of the 1986 amendments
was to encourage private lawyers to contribute legal resources in a joint effort with
government lawyers. Congress envisioned a partnership effort with the Department of
Justice playing the role of senior partner. We have worked both with attorneys in the
Department's Civil Fraud Unit in Washington and with various U.S. Attorney's offices, and
have been impressed by the high level of skill, dedication and public spirit displayed by
each of these government attorneys. However, it is simply a fact of life that government
resources are limited. The defendants spare no resources in fighting these cases, and all
too frequently the budgets allocated for experts, depositions and litigation expense are
inadequate for the government to fight the defendants on an even battlefield. This makes
the contributions of private attorneys all the more necessary.
So, to fulfill our part of the "partnership," we must commit years of
attorney time and resources to hard-fought and expensive litigation. False claims
defendants routinely field a phalanx of attorneys to represent them thoroughly and
aggressively. For example, we represent a qui tam plaintiff in a case the government has
joined against Litton Systems Inc. This case is now in its fifth year, and Litton is
represented by three large corporate law firms. In this case alone, we have had to commit
approximately 15,000 hours of time and have expended substantial amounts of money for
experts' fees, depositions and transcript costs and the like. With the trial date still
seven months away, the total investment in time and expenses for our firm is already about
$3,000,000, all of which is at risk unless and until the case is successfully concluded.
But, as great as the financial risk is for lawyers, it does not compare to the personal
and professional risks taken by the whistleblowers. Those employees who challenge the
conduct of their current or former employers frequently undergo a life-changing
experience: they are frequently threatened and harassed; they are often ostracized within
their own company and blackballed from employment throughout the industry; many risk
financial ruin because they become unemployable; friendships may be destroyed and all too
often even their family relationships are severely jeopardized.
Even though the 1986 amendments contained a very strong anti-retaliation provision to
protect employees who utilize the provisions of the act, there seems to be an
ever-increasing number of ways in which companies attempt to retaliate. I would like to
bring to your attention some of the recent retaliation experienced by just three of our
clients:
In November, 1990, Chester Walsh filed a false claims case against General Electric,
alleging that GE had diverted millions of dollars in foreign military aid that Congress
had intended for the government of Israel. The Department of Justice joined the case,
re-affirming Mr. Walsh's allegations, and is seeking a treble damage recovery of
$120,000,00 to the Treasury. GE has responded by threatening to terminate Mr. Walsh's
employment and has told us that it may file a suit against Mr. Walsh to recover back any
amount he may be awarded under the False Claims Act for his efforts in this case. They
base their claim on the allegation that Mr. Walsh did not come to GE sooner to report the
fraud that he witnessed. GE makes this claim despite the facts that:
1) Mr. Walsh, who was stationed in Israel while the fraud occurred, had a well-founded
fear that his safety would be jeopardized if he reported the fraud. (Specifically, Mr.
Walsh feared reprisals from an Israeli general who is now serving a 13-year prison
sentence for, among other things, placing a contract on the life of another individual who
had provided the Israeli government with information damaging to this general.)
2) Based on the experience of other whistleblowers, Mr. Walsh believed that his career
would be ruined if he were to report the fraud to GE.
3) Because his superiors were aware of the fraud, Mr. Walsh believed that the reporting
of the violations would have led to an internal cover-up.
In our view, GE's threats are a meritless and blatant attempt to undermine the False
Claims Act by attempting to take away the incentives Congress provided. Three recent court
decisions have concluded that the False Claims Act bars third party claims or
counterclaims against qui tam plaintiffs. See Mortgages Inc. v. U.S. District Court for
the District of Nevada, 934 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1991) ; United States ex rel.
Newsham v. Lockheed, 92 Daily Journal D.A.R. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1991); and United
States ex rel. Madden v. General Dynamics Corporation, CV 88-5253 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
If GE does pursue Mr. Walsh, the message GE will send to other would-be whistleblowers
is clear: If you dare to file a qu tam case against GE, you will be exposed to lengthy,
expensive and harassing litigation.
In a case filed against Teledyne Inc., the defendant has sought to intimidate the
whistleblower, Klaus Kirchhoff, by filing a counterclaim alleging that Mr. Kirchhoff
violated its Fourth Amendment rights when he provided government prosecutors with his own
file copies of documents evidencing wrongdoing by Teledyne. Teledyne's novel and
preposterous position is that our client is liable for the entire cost of defending the
company against the government investigation. The implication of this position is
overwhelming. If Teledyne were to succeed, it would mean that any person who turns over
documents to the government evidencing wrongdoing by his employer would be subjecting
himself to financial ruin. Even though we believe Teledyne's claim is totally meritless,
you can imagine the impact upon an individual who is told that he may be held personally
accountable for tens of millions of dollars because he reported a crime to the government.
Retaliation has taken a different form in a case filed against Northrop. Our client,
Glenn Rohrer, filed a false claims case against Northrop, alleging improprieties in the
construction of the B-2 facilities. The case was unsealed in the summer of 1991, and in
the fall, Mr. Rohrer testified under subpoena to a congressional committee about the
allegations of his qui tam case and about other improprieties he had witnessed at
Northrop. Since then, Mr. Rohrer has been increasingly isolated at work and has received
virtually no work assignments. Instead, his previously assigned tasks have been delegated
to others, and he is shut out of meetings and interaction with other employees. The
psychological toll this has taken is significant and the message it sends to other
Northrop employees is clear.
Unfortunately, the current employee protection provisions of the act provide no ready
remedy for Mr. Rohrer's situation. The act instead provides for only double back pay
damages and reinstatement. In light of Northrop's conduct and that of other defendants,
Congress may wish to add additional protections for whistleblowers by providing for both
injunctive relief and punitive damages. If companies believe that actions such as those
taken against Mr. Rohrer will deter others from filing false claims cases, they may be
willing to pay the monetary penalties of double back pay damages. If, however, their
conduct demonstrates bad faith and a clear intent to intimidate other employees, that
would make them liable to punitive damage and these companies may re-assess whether they
would engage in such retaliatory conduct.
Given all the risks associated with pursuing a False Claims Act case, it is important
that the level of compensation at the end of the case be commensurate with those risks. We
hope that members of Congress will remember this when they are approached by those in the
defense industry who suggest that recoveries under this act are too generous and that
these recoveries should be capped in some way. If a plaintiff gets 15 percent to 25
percent of a recovery, this means the U.S. government gets 75 percent to 85 percent of the
money, money that would not have been returned to the U.S. Treasury absent the action
taken by that courageous individual. Moreover, when qui tam plaintiffs do ultimately
receive millions of dollars in hard fought cases, it will encourage others who know of
fraud against the government to take similar risks and file their own false claims cases,
again providing substantial benefits to the American taxpayers.
Thank you.
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